INTRODUCTION
The binary distinction between content-neutral and content-based speech regulations is of central importance in First Amendment doctrine. 1 This distinction has been the subject of U.S. Supreme Court attention on several occasions. 2 As the case law has evolved, however, this apparently crucial distinction has become less clear, coherent, and practical, such that further attempts to establish any clear hierarchical distinction are no longer worth the effort. This surprising state of affairs has arisen from several judicial developments, operating jointly as well as separately. These developments, 3 discussed below, 4 have eroded a basic assumption underlying much of free speech jurisprudence: that content-based restrictions are uniformly subjected to a more rigorous, exacting, and demanding judicial scrutiny than are content-neutral restrictions. 5 As the validity of this assumption has become more dubious, the clarity, coherence, and practical significance of the distinction between contentneutral and content-based regulations have eroded beyond the point of recoverability.
This Essay establishes that content-based restrictions on speech are no longer uniformly subjected to unequivocally more demanding judicial scrutiny than content-neutral restrictions by examining several recent jurisprudential trends and their effects. 6 The five relevant trends are (1) the compounding complications and failed attempts in seeking to distinguish between content-neutral and content-based regulations of speech in the first place; (2) the crucial judicial option, distinctively available in content-neutral regulation cases, to insist on the realistic availability of ample valued alternative channels through which speakers can continue to convey their message; (3) in partial offset thereof, the rise of the judicial option, thus far in content-based but not yet content-neutral speech regulation cases, to interpret strict scrutiny 7 to require something such as compelling empirical evidence, grounds, and proof of the relevant causation and the effectiveness of the particular speech regulation; (4) the growth of judicial self-indulgence and untested judicial speculation in relying on the supposed availability of uniformly less speech-restrictive and thus more narrowly tailored 8 regulatory regimes; and finally (5) the malleability, if not the sheer arbitrariness, of judicial descriptions of the public interests underlying speech regulations such that the interest may seem to be of compelling gravity or weight 9 under one judicial description but not under an arguably quite sensible alternative description. 9. For discussions of compelling or overridingly important governmental interests, see cases cited infra notes 1178-21.
10. These five concerns are elaborated infra Parts I-III.
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Taken separately and in conjunction, these five trends have disrupted any unambiguous hierarchy of rigor as between content-based and content-neutral judicial scrutiny. These trends have more broadly undermined-beyond effective retrieval-any sufficient clarity, coherence, and practical public value of the distinction between contentbased and content-neutral regulations. The five relevant trends and their relevant effects are elaborated below.
I. SEEKING MERELY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CONTENT-NEUTRAL
AND CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH Scholars have recognized a range of important problems associated with the jurisprudence of supposedly content-neutral and content-based regulations of speech for some time. For purposes of this Essay, the narrower focus herein is on the sheer unmanageability of the distinction itself, as in the futile attempts to establish a clear and useful distinction between the two categories in even the most recent, thoughtful, and selfconscious cases. To illustrate the basic problem through the most recent case law, it is helpful to begin with a brief reminder of the differences in the judicial tests applied to regulations of speech, which are contingent upon the initial classification as content-neutral or content-based.
Once a court has made the initial classification, content-based regulations of speech are generally subjected to a particularly rigorous and exacting degree of judicial scrutiny.
11 Traditionally, this strict scrutiny encompasses two requirements. Specifically, the speech regulation in such a case must promote a compelling or overridingly important government interest, and the regulation must be necessary to the narrowly tailored promotion of that interest.
12
Of late, there has been some interest in modifying the standard application of strict scrutiny uniformly in all content-based speech regulation cases. 13 Thus, Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan have raised the possibility of a constitutional test in which the degree of judicial rigor is merely proportionate or somehow fitting to the perceived degree of harm addressed by the regulation, 14 considerations. 15 At present, the law supposedly requires the most demanding scrutiny of standard content-based regulations of speech.
16
Whether the Breyer-Kagan approach is nonetheless of normative or descriptive interest may, however, be worthy of serious reflection.
17
In contrast to the most typical approaches to speech restrictions categorized as content-based, content-neutral regulations commonly receive less exacting, less demanding, mid-level judicial scrutiny. There are certainly variations among the content-neutral test formulations, 18 but the most broadly applied formulations seem to require a significant or substantial government interest. 19 There must then be reasonable or proportionate, if imperfect, tailoring of the regulation to address the significant government interest. 20 And, crucially for this Essay's purposes, content-neutral speech regulations must assumedly "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information" 21 in question.
The main argument below is that in practice there are insufficient grounds to think of the primary content-based speech regulation tests as systematically more rigorous, demanding, or speech-protective than the 15. See id. at 2551 (listing the importance of the provision's objectives, the extent to which the provision will achieve the objectives, and other less restrictive alternatives as additional considerations); see also Denver Area Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996) (plurality opinion) (noting the Court's aversion to imposing judicial restraints amounting to a "straightjacket").
16. See cases cited supra note 11. 17. Each of the Sections below shed some light on the Breyer-Kagan "proportionality" or broad-based balancing review of what are typically treated, binarily, as either content-based or content-neutral regulations.
18. For reasons not fully articulated, the Court seems to dispense with the otherwise standard requirement that the content-neutral speech regulation leave open ample alternative speech channels in at least some cases involving a mixture of speech and conduct, known as symbolic conduct. 
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most typical content-neutral tests. Stated more broadly, the distinction between content-based and content-neutral tests is no longer worth maintaining. But it should not be casually assumed that the underlying distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations itself is clear. The broad range of problems associated with the distinction between content-based and content-neutral speech regulations in general appear elsewhere. 22 However, the courts' understandable inability to uniformly and consistently settle upon even the basic elements of content-neutrality is important for this Essay's analysis. 23 One such basic conflict is between formalist, or narrowly literalist, approaches and more pragmatist, substantive, motivationalist, justificationalist approaches to content-neutrality. Very roughly, the conflict in this respect has been between formalist approaches that ask whether the applicability of the speech regulation depends upon merely reading or otherwise examining the content of the speech, 24 or on a more pragmatic inquiry into whether the regulation is motivated or justified by 22 reasons somehow independent of the content of the speech, including disapproval of the content of the message.
25
Both the formalist and the pragmatist approaches can, not surprisingly, quickly become rather murky in their definition and scope. But the otherwise appealing pragmatist approaches have thus far exhibited more internal complications, if not sheer inconsistencies. Judicial declarations intended to clarify, restate, or elaborate upon a pragmatist test formulation often unintentionally depart from other similarly intended declarations.
Consider, for example, the fraying of the basic idea that "[t]he principal inquiry" in distinguishing content-based from content-neutral regulations "is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." 26 The very idea of a "principal" inquiry itself implies the possibility of other, nonprincipal inquiries. Additionally, the main concern in many cases will not be why the regulation was "adopted;" rather, it will be why the regulation was later applied in a given case, 27 and perhaps not elsewhere. Most importantly, the idea of restricting a message because of "disagreement" requires much deeply controversial development. Must a government actor disagree with the message, or could a restriction be content-based if the disagreement with the message was solely that of some third party, as in some "heckler's veto" 28 cases? It also seems 
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arbitrary to confine content-based restrictions to cases of anyone's "disagreement" 29 with the message of a speech. Suppose a government genuinely agreed with a message but also considered the message to be premature, politically embarrassing, or susceptible to misunderstanding and overreaction. Then, on that basis, the government suppressed the message. 30 Why could that not be a content-based regulation? Depending upon how the courts choose to answer any of the above questions, the boundary line between content-based and content-neutral speech regulations will vary. But thoughtful judicial attempts to clarify the doctrine have compounded the loss of clarity and the confusion over the scope of the more pragmatic approaches to content-neutrality.
Consider, for example, the pragmatic approaches to content-neutrality that seek to bar (1) government supervision of the "marketplace of ideas"; 31 (2) government control, more narrowly, over "which issues are worth discussing"; 32 (3) government censorial intent; 33 (4) government censorial intent specifically "to value some forms of speech over others"; 34 (5) government censorial intent in the specific form of valuing some forms of speech over other forms "to distort public debate"; 35 (6) restriction of expression "because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter"; 36 (7) prohibition of "the expression of an idea simply because society [as perhaps distinct from the government] finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"; 37 (8) creation of a "'substantial risk of eliminating certain ideas or viewpoints' from the public forum"; 38 (9) It is fair to say that each of the ten formulas listed above has the potential for including or excluding as content-neutral some regulation not similarly classed by one or more of the remaining formulas. The ten formulas have family resemblances but no more in common. Working through the various possible conflicts would be tedious and unnecessary. Merely for the sake of example, though, it is plain that not all disfavoring of particular speech involves "a substantial risk of eliminating" 41 that speech from any forum. Nor is restriction of all speech on some given subject 42 coextensive with restricting speech on only one disfavored viewpoint 43 on that given subject. Examples of these definitional inconsistencies could easily be multiplied. But the point is simply that those who assert that contentneutral speech regulation is unequivocally less rigorous and less demanding than content-based speech regulation should at least recognize a remarkable lack of clarity and consistency in the basic categories with which they must work.
II. ALTERNATIVE SPEECH CHANNELS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT UNIQUE TO CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATIONS
It seems well settled that content-neutral, but not content-based, restrictions on speech must leave ample alternative channels available for conveying the speaker's message. 44 The standard multipart test requires Significantly, though, a requirement that a regulation leave open anything such as ample alternative speech channels in the case of contentneutral speech regulations immediately destroys any hierarchy of rigor, exactingness, or stringency between the two tests. Nothing prevents a court, relying on the ample available alternative speech channels requirement, from imposing a more demanding test under contentneutrality than under a content-based test. It is possible for a conscientious, perceptive, and fair-minded court to thus strike down a speech regulation under a content-neutral test that it would uphold under the standard content-based test. Any hierarchy of rigor between the two tests is lost on this consideration alone.
In a sense, this should not be surprising. A crucial requirement commonly imposed in content-neutral restriction cases, but not in content-based restriction cases, could always be decisive and thus flip the content-based and to fail to leave the speaker with ample satisfactory alternative speech channels. (1980) . Linmark, however, does not seem to determine or assume that the speech regulation at issue was contentbased or ask about the availability of remaining alternative speech channels. If anything, the logic in Linmark seems to run in the other direction. Specifically, the Court seems to have used the absence of satisfactory remaining alternative speech channels as one indication that the speech regulation at issue was content-based. This seems roughly akin to the much more general process by which one might infer a legally wrongful intent from the actual or predictable consequences of the act in question. casually assumed hierarchy of rigor. Therefore, it is ill-founded to think of content-based tests as uniformly more demanding than content-neutral tests or of the latter as uniformly more lenient. The two sorts of tests can at a minimum easily cover much of the same ground or reach equivalent results-where content-neutral tests are not open to more demanding applications. Perhaps the most important explanation for why these remarkable possibilities are not more widely noticed is the difficulty of distinguishing the ideas of alternative speech channels 50 from the genuinely separate idea of one degree or another of narrow tailoring. Perhaps there is a belief that one more or less implies the other. Also, some may believe that if there is any difference between the ample alternative speech channels question and that of the degree of narrow tailoring, the difference is likely to be murky or trivial. Furthermore, to the extent that courts choose a lax interpretation of the ample alternative speech channels requirement, the disruptive possibilities are less likely to be noticeable.
Thus, the differences between tailoring analysis and alternative speech channels analysis tend to be underappreciated, if recognized at all. 51 Yet the basic distinction between narrow tailoring and alternative speech channels remains. 
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at stake-the difference between alternative government regulations of speech and alternative remaining avenues for communicating a message. 53 For one, consider a new restriction on speech that is far from narrowly tailored in that the restriction burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to promote the government interest at stake. In particular, imagine a prohibition of all battery-powered amplified speech by electoral candidates for the sake of a government interest in allowing local residents to enjoy the evening hours undisturbed by such speech. 54 The regulation, however, is not limited to the evening hours or to residential areas, and thus might prohibit a fair amount of harmless candidate speech using the technology in question. While the regulation might be underinclusive with respect to its stated goal, it is also grossly overinclusive 55 and thus not especially narrowly tailored on any convincing calculus. 56 This lack of tailoring between the actual impact of the ordinance and the scope of its intended purpose does not mean, however, that the above prohibition adversely affects the free speech interests and values of any of the electoral candidates or listeners in question. Any speech restriction, whether narrowly tailored or not, may leave available to the affected speakers a wide range of realistic, effective alternative speech channelschannels perhaps even more promotive of the speaker's own free speech interests and free speech values 57 than any channel formerly used but now prohibited. Speakers in the hypothetical case mentioned above might easily utilize non-battery-powered amplification systems or switch to other equally or more effective speech media.
A Imagine a case of a perfectly tailored regulation that effectively targets all of the sources of some perceived harm and nothing that is not a source of that harm. 59 The harm in question might be, for example, the disturbed sleep of persons in their residences. Does this perfect regulatory tailoring convey anything at all about whether any speakers still have realistically available one or more equally or more constitutionally valuable ways of conveying their message? Clearly the answer is no. Any given speakers might find that this perfectly narrowly tailored regulation either has left them largely without a voice or has had no adverse effect-if not a positive effect-on realizing their own free speech values.
60
The tailoring and alternative speech channels inquiries thus have very little to do with one another. 61 Crucially for this Essay's purposes, an alternative speech channels requirement can impose different and more stringent free speech requirements than can even the most exacting narrow tailoring requirements. Thus, a content-neutral regulation test requiring ample alternative speech channels can be more demanding than a content-based regulation test requiring a compelling interest and narrow tailoring.
To better see this possibility, consider the logic of the debate over alternative speech channels between the majority and the dissenters in 
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movie theaters. 63 The Court divided over whether the ordinance was content-neutral, 64 with the majority concluding that because the ordinance was justified by the movie theater's secondary or social effects 65 unrelated to the content of the speech, 66 the regulation could be treated as content-neutral. 67 Assuming the content-neutrality of the zoning regulation in question, the Court was then required to consider whether the regulation met the alternative speech channels element of the test for content-neutral regulations of speech. 68 Not surprisingly, there is room for judicial discretion in applying the test in practice, 69 as well as generous room for variations in how, precisely, this requirement is to be formulated in the first place.
The canonical formulation of the alternative speech channels element of the test for content-neutral regulations holds that a restriction must "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." 70 Departures from that particular formulation arise, however, and each such departure has some potential for encouraging or discouraging a rigorous or a relaxed interpretation of this content-neutral test element.
Thus, the City of Renton majority and dissenters referred, variously, to a requirement that the speech regulation "not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication"; 71 A regulation may not, for example, limit-reasonably or unreasonably-a speaker's alternative channels of communication 76 if no such alternative channels ever existed. More substantively, a difference clearly exists between emphasizing a mere allowance for alternative channels 77 and requiring their actual presence in ample measure.
78
For this Essay's purposes, the most interesting judicial options in this context are the most speech protective 79 because they illustrate a crucial point: Rigorously interpreted content-neutral regulation tests can be as demanding-actually, more demanding and more speech protectivethan typical content-based regulation tests that lack any such requirement. 80 The realistic possibility that the "ample alternative speech channels" requirement could result in a content-neutral regulation test that is more rigorous than the strict scrutiny of content-based regulation tests 81 is hinted at in the dissent in City of Renton. 82 The dissenters in that case would have held unconstitutional the minimum distance zoning requirements for adult theaters for failing to leave open ample alternative channels. 83 While the ordinance left about five percent of the city's land unregulated, much of the five percent was either already occupied or else unsuitable for use as a movie theater. 84 The Free Speech Clause clearly does not guarantee commercial profitability of adult theaters in every jurisdiction. 85 But according to the dissenters, the ample available speech channels requirement should prohibit consigning such speakers to great 75 , sitting by designation) ("If a zoning code passes muster as a time, place, and manner regulation, if it is content neutral, and if it advances a substantial governmental interest, the question remaining is whether it leaves reasonable means of commercial adult activity as an alternative to its restrictions.").
85. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 54 (majority opinion). 89 for example, illustrated the possibility of judicial sensitivity to distinct free speech values and aims at the level of the particular speaker.
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90 Not all speakers have similar priorities, aims, resources, audiences, time frames, capacities, and limitations. 91 For some speakers, the opportunity to distribute leaflets on a street in practically unimpeded fashion, along with a similar opportunity to engage in faceto-face conversation, 92 may be invaluable. Such opportunities may not be realistically replaceable by alternative arrangements, including chanting, displaying signs, or other forms of protest.
93 But depending upon the contextual nuances, any one of these or other channels of communication might be essential to a speaker's ability to effectively convey the intended message.
94
In some contexts, the ability to post a yard sign will not suffice as an alternative to a speech channel permitting a detailed verbal argument. 95 In other contexts, as in a neighbor speaking to neighbors, the realistic free speech value of a yard sign may exceed that of a speech channel allowing one to speak with more precision and detail. 96 In any given case, these practical differences among speech channels may be of decisive constitutional weight. The unavailability of yard signs may condemn the most vitally important and narrowly tailored speech regulation. 97 To the extent that courts choose to recognize and accord appropriate constitutional weight to such differences, a content-neutral regulation test with an ample alternative speech channels requirement might prove as or more demanding, and as or more speech protective, than a content-based "strict scrutiny" test without such a requirement. 98 If even a compellingly vital and precisely tailored content-neutral speech regulation fails on a rigorous interpretation to leave available ample alternative speech channels, then the hierarchy and meaningfulness of the distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations evaporates.
III. THE INCREASINGLY MURKY BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH ALTERNATIVE SPEECH CHANNEL ANALYSIS NOW TAKES PLACE A. Strict Scrutiny and Required Degrees of Evidentiary Weight
In some content-based regulation cases of late, courts have, in effect, added what amounts in practice to a further requirement to the two strict scrutiny elements of a compelling government interest and narrow tailoring. 99 In such cases, the government must do more than plausibly cite a properly formulated compelling government interest and present a plausible claim that the interest will in fact be sufficiently advanced. Instead, in such cases, the regulation's evidentiary and causal bases "must be compelling and not merely plausible," 100 and the government must "present a compelling basis" 101 for its causal theory. This is plainly not 
B. Judicial Self-Indulgence in Narrow Tailoring Determinations
The occasional dual role of "compellingness" thus renders murky the broader background against which separate decisions about alternative speech channels must operate. Additional murkiness results from occasional judicial self-indulgence in declaring hypothetical regulatory schemes to be both feasible and less speech restrictive overall, or perhaps more narrowly tailored than the regulatory scheme actually adopted in a given case.
In these narrow tailoring feasibility cases, the most typical problem is not that the court misguidedly rules out a more narrowly tailored hypothetical regulation as infeasible where that regulation would in fact be viable. More frequently, the problem is the court's questionable conclusion, based on a limited judicial record, that some hypothetical regulatory scheme would really be viable and sufficiently effective in practice.
As one illustrative problem among many, 112 consider that a court's striking down of a particular regulatory practice-perhaps a thirty-fivefoot speech buffer zone 113 -might itself change the incentives and the dynamics as between the government and regulated speakers. The future behavior of a perhaps increased number of speakers under a new rule cannot be read off of prior historical practice under a rule now declared invalid. 114 Nor will the actual extent or depth of a government's historical good faith and reasonable consideration of arguably 115 less intrusive speech regulations invariably be clearly evident from the judicial record. 116 To the extent that judicial determinations as to the realistic 115. Again, it is difficult to believe that based on the judicial record, a reviewing court can typically consider the various short-and long-term free speech benefits-and costs-of a supposedly less restrictive rule on not only the parties before the court, but also on other actual and potential speakers with no voice in the particular case at hand. Even parties involved in the litigation may emphasize their own overall interests as distinct from their narrow free speech interests.
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feasibility and effects of merely hypothetical speech regulations involve judicial speculation on subtle and complex matters, the impact of the tailoring test again loses clarity and determinacy.
C. Re-valuing the Weight of Re-describable Government Interests
The familiar distinction between compelling government interests 117 and non-compelling government interests is essential to any meaningful difference between tests for content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech. 118 Despite its familiarity, this distinction is much more problematic than courts commonly recognize. Regardless of the distinction's apparent rigor, finding or not finding a compelling government interest is a surprisingly manipulable enterprise.
Formalistically, a compelling interest is described as "of the highest order,"
119 "overriding," 120 or "paramount." 121 However, this apparent rigor has not prevented courts from recognizing, for example, the general protection of the golden, and not merely bald, eagle as a genuinely compelling government interest, whether either species is threatened or not.
122 Protection of the planet-and thus presumably protecting the otherwise non-threatened golden eagle-from catastrophic climate change would also count as a compelling government interest or as a opposed to prohibiting begging to prevent fraud). For an exceptionally critical judicial response to this sort of narrow tailoring jurisprudence, see Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1062 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) ("Fortunately for my colleagues, their proposed solutions don't need to pass constitutional muster; they can just toss them out as supposedly superior alternatives. But if the city were gullible enough to follow these suggestions, my colleagues would find reasons to strike down the new rules in the next round of litigation.").
117. he government has a compelling interest in protecting the bald eagle as our national symbol, and the golden eagle, as its survival and the survival of the bald eagle are intimately intertwined. The removal of the bald eagle from the list of species protected under the Endangered Species Act does not render this interest a nullity; . . . 'whether there [are] 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles,' the government's interest in protecting them remains compelling." (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002))). This example is provided to demonstrate how courts use broader, compelling interests to justify regulation of narrower, not nearly as compelling interests-not to minimize the importance of environmental concerns in general.
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[Vol. 67 paramount interest of the highest order. However, placing these two separate interests in the same constitutional category, by itself, impeaches the credibility and the jurisprudential value and integrity of that category. Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has chosen to classify "public safety on . . . streets and sidewalks" as well as fundamental federal constitutional rights-based "access to . . . healthcare facilities" as, by contrast, merely "undeniably significant." 123 It is also apparently the case that, at least for the present, "a municipality's asserted interests in traffic safety . . . while significant, have never been held to be compelling." 124 On the other hand, "[w]hile it is true that there are no authoritative cases holding that a traffic concern satisfies the 'compelling interest' test, nor are there authoritative cases holding that a traffic concern cannot satisfy the test."
125
It is perhaps not surprising that courts tend not to think of traffic safety as a compelling government interest. The problem, though, is that traffic safety and various other broadly related interests can be reframed, reconceptualized, re-described, elevated to a more generalized level, or thought of entirely apart from closely related and overlapping interests. Traffic safety can be reconceived as preventing deaths. With some manipulation, interests that are often judicially deemed merely substantial, and thus insufficient under strict scrutiny, can be promoted to the ranks of compelling government interests and thus potentially sufficient even under strict scrutiny for content-based regulations.
For example, consider that genuinely promoting the safety of pedestrians, users of sidewalks and medians, and of drivers can often be re-described as promoting the avoidance of serious bodily injury and premature death. In various contexts, unsurprisingly, some aspect of the public's basic physical safety is easily described as compelling and thus as potentially sufficient even under strict scrutiny. 126 If there is no 2015]
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discernible principle establishing when safety-of persons, and certainly of non-threatened golden eagles-is compelling, the meaningfulness of a content-based versus content-neutral regulation distinction is undermined and impeached. Even the most careful judicial choices among broader and narrower formulations of an interest are often readily and deeply contestable. 127 Finally, to the extent that determining whether any given interest, however formulated, is compelling must depend on empirical evidence in any sense, the determination is inevitably prisoner to the various crucial limitations on the validity and reliability of such evidence available to the courts in a given case. 128 
CONCLUSION
The binary distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech may seem reasonably 129 clear. The respective constitutional tests may also seem hierarchical in their stringency. This Essay, however, takes issue with both claims. The requirement of ample remaining alternative speech channels in content-neutral but not contentbased regulation cases, by itself, upsets any hierarchy of stringency as between the two tests. Additionally, the cumulative effect of the alternative speech channels requirement, along with the other trends and phenomena outlined above, is to undermine the meaningfulness of the
